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I. BACKGROUND OF THE REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE
POST – USSR AREA
A
FTER almost seventy years of its existence, the USSR ap-
proached turbulent times.  Escalating regional conflicts and ac-
celerating political and economic difficulties entailed the
collapse of entire political and economic foundations of the USSR.  The
USSR republics’ parade of sovereignty was marked by the year 1990.
Even the USSR strongholds, the Russian Federation (Russia) and
Ukraine, issued declarations of sovereignty and officially questioned the
supremacy of the USSR laws over their national legislation.  Govern-
ments of the remaining USSR republics openly struggled with the Krem-
lin over the increase of their national competences.  It became apparent
that sooner or later the USSR republics would exercise the taboo provi-
sion of the USSR Constitution that grants them a right to the voluntary
and unilateral termination of their USSR membership.1  To prevent this,
Soviet politicians began to search for adequate alternatives to the USSR,
including a socialist federation based on the principle of democratic cen-
tralism.2  There was hope to sign a new Union Treaty in 1991.  The Union
Treaty was drafted and circulated in the first half of 1991.  It was aimed at
the creation of a federation of the post-USSR republics with a single eco-
nomic space.  Upon the completion of the negotiation process, the USSR
republics agreed to sign the new Union Treaty in Novoogavevo, Russia,
on August 19, 1991.  However, the shocking August coup (launched the
same day) eliminated all hopes to wrap up the Novoogarevo process and
irrevocably accelerated the collapse of the entire USSR.
At this crucial moment, the Commonwealth of Independent States
* Donetsk National University (Ukraine); Queen Mary, University of London.
1. Article 72 of the USSR Constitution adopted in 1977 reads as follows: “Each
Union Republic shall retain the right to freely secede from the USSR.” USSR
CONST. art. 72.
2. Article 3 of the USSR Constitution clarifies the meaning of the principle of demo-
cratic centralism as “the electiveness of all bodies of state authority from the low-
est to the highest, their accountability to the people, and the obligation of lower
bodies to observe the decisions of higher ones.” Id. art. 3.
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(CIS) emerged as a substitution to the vanishing USSR.3  The CIS was
born on December 8, 1991, in the picturesque residence of the Belarusian
Government in the Belovezhskaya forest reserve, where leaders of Be-
larus, Russia, and Ukraine signed the Agreement to establish the CIS.
Shortly after, on December 21, 1991, the heads of eight former USSR
republics (except for three Baltic States) joined the CIS initiative.  In De-
cember 1993, Georgia joined the CIS.  The CIS Charter (signed in Janu-
ary 1993), and the CIS Economic Union Treaty (signed in September
1993) are basic CIS multilateral agreements.  The former fixes the CIS
institutional framework and major areas of competence.  The latter
promulgates the necessity for formation of the common economic space
based on the principles of: (1) free movement of goods, services, workers,
and capitals; (2) elaboration of concerted money and credit, tax, price,
customs, and foreign economic policies; and (3) creation of favourable
conditions for development of direct production links.
However, the CIS Member States shortly found themselves in conflicts
with one another over a wide range of economic and security issues.  It
appeared that former USSR republics moved towards a market economy
at different and asymmetric speeds.  Some CIS Member States were ea-
ger to avoid close interstate cooperation in order to escape potential Rus-
sian domination.  Meanwhile, Russia considered its interests damaged by
losing its traditional geo-political position as the Eurasian political and
economic centre.  These contradictions hampered the speed of CIS inte-
gration and entailed mutual suspicion and preference to pursuing na-
tional self-interests by the CIS Member States.  However, the CIS still
remains the largest and the most considerable substitution for the former
USSR, although it is less competent and has had relatively modest suc-
cess of mutual integration.  In contrast to the USSR, the CIS pursues the
maintenance of traditionally close economic links within the CIS area
while preserving the Member States’ sovereignties.  Nevertheless, the re-
ality proved the failure of initial hopes.  Eventually, the CIS Member
States faced a complicated dilemma of whether to sacrifice some of their
national interest to achieve progress in the CIS integration or preserve
the national sovereignty at any cost.
This chapter does not offer the comprehensive analysis of the whole
regional integration process within the post-USSR area.  Instead it pro-
vides the general overview of major institutional and legal aspects of the
CIS regional cooperation.  Special attention is paid to competence and
institutional framework of the newly emerged CIS regional integration
structures.  In conclusion, the chapter presents some general delibera-
tions regarding nature and perspectives of economic integration within
the CIS.
3. For comprehensive materials about the CIS in English, see CIS Executive Commit-
tee, available at http://www.cis.minsk.by (last visited on Aug. 28, 2004).
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II. CURRENT STATE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION
WITHIN THE CIS
The CIS institutional and legal complications could explain the con-
stant quest of the CIS Member States for new mechanisms of political
and economic integration.  One may argue that the CIS was born as a
“giant on clay feet.”  Indeed, as long as the CIS remains an intergovern-
mental forum, it can hardly fulfil its objectives.
A. THE CIS COMPETENCE
The CIS was set up as an intergovernmental forum to avoid any danger
to the CIS Member States sovereignties.  That is why, from the outset, the
CIS was not granted any supranational powers and, consequently, a legal
personality in international law.4  The CIS Member States enforce their
cooperation initiatives through multilateral and bilateral agreements in
the following areas: (1) coordination of foreign policy; (2) protection of
human rights and freedoms; (3) cooperation in establishing the Common
Economic Space and common customs policy; (4) setting common trans-
port and communication networks; (5) coordination of social and migra-
tion policies; (6) fight with organised crime; and (7) collective security
and military cooperation.5  Among those areas economic, social, legal,
and military cooperation constitute explicit priorities of the CIS integra-
tion agenda.
Within the area of collective security and military cooperation, the CIS
Member States may consult each other in order to prevent any military
threat to their territories and may coordinate protection of common bor-
ders.  Military observers and peace keeping forces could be invited to
provide security in the “hot spots” within the CIS borders (the CIS
peace-keeping operations took place in the disputed Karabakh area be-
tween Armenia and Azerbaijan, Dnestr river area in Moldova, Abkhasia,
and Tajikistan).
In the areas of economic, social, and legal cooperation, the CIS Mem-
ber States coordinate their efforts to: (1) establish the Common Eco-
nomic Space and Common Information Space; (2) harmonize national
social programmes; (3) develop common transport, energy, and commu-
nication networks; (4) launch financial cooperation; (5) protect mutual
investments and intellectual property rights; (6) provide mutual assis-
tance in environmental disasters; and (7) establish common programmes
in education, health protection, culture, and sport.6  Above all, the CIS
Charter calls the CIS Member States to sign the bilateral agreements on
4. CIS CHARTER art. 1, available at http://www.cis.minsk.by/ENGLISH/charter.htm
(last visited Aug. 28, 2004).  The CIS was granted the observer status in the UN on
March 24, 1994. The CIS Charter was registered by the UN Secretariat as a multi-
lateral agreement in accordance with Article 102 of the UN Charter on August 3,
1994.
5. Id. art. 4.
6. Id. art. 19.
634 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 10
mutual legal assistance and approximation of national legislations.7
B. THE CIS INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Nearly seventy institutions and specialised agencies were set up within
the CIS framework.  Most of them were created to coordinate sectoral
cooperation between the CIS Member States.8  Several intergovernmen-
tal institutions ensure general coordination of the CIS Member States co-
operation across all areas of the CIS competence.
The CIS Council of Heads of State occupies the apex of the CIS institu-
tional framework.  As members of the Council, heads of the CIS Member
States are authorised to consider any issue within the CIS competence by
unanimous vote.9  However, the CIS Member States may go ahead for
the enhanced cooperation by signing bilateral or multilateral agreements
in case of abstention by any of the members of the Council to specific CIS
initiatives.  The Council has the authority to consider any conflicts be-
tween the CIS Member States.10
The CIS Council of Heads of Government supervises cooperation on
the level of the CIS Member States governments.  This organisation pri-
marily focuses on economic cooperation between the CIS Member
States, and coordinates the collaboration of the CIS Member States gov-
ernments within specific policies of common interest, including industry,
agriculture, transport, communication, energy, tax, customs and financ-
ing, research and science, and funding for the CIS institutions.
The CIS Executive Committee is a major executive organisation of the
CIS.  As the chairman, the Executive Secretary of the CIS is authorised
to represent the CIS before international organisations and other coun-
tries.  Until April 29, 1998, Belarusian politician Ivan Korotchenya had
been the Executive Secretary of the CIS.  He was later substituted by the
notorious Russian tycoon, Boris Berezovsky.  Since April 2, 1999, Rus-
sian politician Yuri Yarov has occupied the office of the CIS Executive
Secretary.  The CIS Executive Committee is responsible for drafting deci-
sions and other legal documents and assisting the exchange of informa-
tion between the CIS Member States and specialised CIS agencies.  One
of the major tasks of the CIS Executive Committee is to sustain interac-
tion between the CIS and international organisations.
The major workload of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly is di-
rected towards the approximation and harmonisation of the CIS Member
7. Id. art. 20.
8. For example, the following specialised agencies: (1) the CIS Anti Terror Centre;
and (2) the CIS Councils of Heads of Home Offices, Revenue Offices, and Secur-
ity Offices.  There were established specialised CIS Councils in transport, commu-
nication networks, agriculture, science, oil and gas, education, sport and tourism,
etc.
9. The exclusive CIS Council of Heads of State competence covers issues like: (1)
amending the CIS Charter; (2) dissolving and establishing new CIS institutes; (3)
hearing reports about activities of other CIS institutes; and (4) delegating its com-
petence to other CIS institutes.
10. CIS CHARTER art. 17(3).
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States legislation.  For this purpose the Assembly issues model laws and
recommendations and forwards them to the CIS parliaments.  The CIS
harmonisation of laws agenda covers: (1) social and consumer protection;
(2) free movement of labour; (3) protection of war prisoners and civilians;
(4) legislation on cultural and education; (5) environmental protection,
science, and research; (6) corruption and crime prevention; and (7) legis-
lation on exercising peacekeeping operations within the CIS.  In the
meantime, the Assembly prepared over 130 model legislative acts (among
them are model civil and criminal codes) and approximately forty recom-
mendations.  The Assembly initiated annual St. Petersburg economic fo-
rums, which consider issues of economic integration within the CIS and
encourages further investment cooperation between the CIS Member
States.
The CIS Economic Court is functioning in accordance with the CIS
Economic Court Statute adopted in 1992.  Only a few CIS Member States
(Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) became parties to the CIS Economic Court
Statute.  The CIS Economic Court is comprised of two judges at most
from each contracting party who ensure the uniform application of agree-
ments and treaties signed by the CIS Member States, as well as acts of the
CIS institutions and agencies.  Additionally, the CIS Economic Court is
competent to solve intergovernmental economic disputes between the
CIS Member States, inter alia with regard to compliance of their states’
national laws to the CIS agreements and legal acts.  However, the Court’s
effectiveness and activism is hampered by ostensibly limited jurisdiction
and the non-binding force of its decisions.11
The CIS Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers was established by the
CIS Council of Heads of State in 1993, to coordinate the common foreign
affairs policy in issues of the Member States common interest.  It shares
its competence with the CIS Council of Defence Ministers in issues re-
lated to peacekeeping activities within the CIS area.  The latter organ
comprises the CIS Ministers of Defence, apart from Moldova, Turkmeni-
stan, and Ukraine, and the CIS Defence Head of Staff.  The CIS Council
of Border Troops Commanders coordinates common defence of external
CIS borders and economic zones.  The Council is comprised of Border
Troops Commanders of the CIS Member States, with exemption to Azer-
baijan, Moldova, and Ukraine.
At first glance, the CIS institutional structure looks too complicated
and overloaded with specialised agencies and advisory organisations.  In-
stitutions with general competence have no authority to issue binding de-
cisions, and therefore, to influence the enforcement procedure in the CIS
Member States.  One may argue that the “deficit of democracy” syn-
drome is inherent to the CIS.  Indeed, the CIS Council of Heads of State
occupies significant decision-making powers without sharing it with the
11. About fifty cases have been decided by the CIS Economic Court from 1994 to
2000.
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CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, which is mainly an advisory forum for
the CIS Member States.  The workload of the CIS institutions drags far
behind the dynamic working schedule of the EU institutions.12
C. REGIONAL INTEGRATION INITIATIVES WITHIN AND
BEYOND THE CIS
From the outset, the CIS Member States have been constantly engaged
in performing dubious tasks, such as working on setting up the Economic
Union based on a customs union and exploring various scenarios of polit-
ical and economic rapprochement that could satisfy their national inter-
ests.  Highlighted below are several major periods of CIS regional
integration.
1. 1991-1994
Foundations of the CIS intergovernmental cooperation were laid down
in the first period from 1991 to 1994.  Immediately after the collapse of
the USSR, the CIS Member States focused their attention on dividing the
USSR property (especially located abroad), armed forces, and weapons
arsenal.  For that purpose, the following major military agreements were
signed in 1992: (1) Agreement on the Status of Strategic Forces; (2)
Agreements on the CIS United Armed Forces and CIS Border Troops;
(3) Declaration on non-use of the force or threat of use of the force in
relations between the CIS member states; and (4) Treaty on Collective
Security.  In accordance with these agreements, the CIS was designated
as competent to undertake peace keeping missions within the territory of
its Member States.  The position of the Chief Commander of the CIS
United Armed Forces was established, and CIS military observers and
collective peace-keeping forces were introduced.  At the same time, the
issue of closer CIS economic cooperation remained a priority of the CIS
integration agenda.  The CIS Member States agreed to fulfil the following
ambitious objectives: (1) approximation/rapprochement of national eco-
nomic legislation; (2) establishment of a single monetary system and co-
ordination of fiscal and credit and monetary policies; (3) free movement
of CIS nationals within the CIS; (4) establishment of the interstate TV
and radio broadcasting companies; and (5) creation of the CIS Interstate
Bank.  The 1993 Economic Union Treaty reflected and unanimously en-
dorsed these goals.13  This treaty was followed by the signing a series of
12. In more than ten years of the CIS functioning, there have been prepared and con-
ducted about thirty meetings of the Council of Heads of State and forty meetings
of the Council of Heads of Government, which resulted in the adoption of more
than 1,000 documents.
13. Ukraine joined the Economic Union as an associate member.  In accordance with
article 4 of the Economic Union Treaty, the contracting parties cooperate to
achieve the establishment of a free trade area/customs union, internal market (four
freedoms), monetary union, common foreign policy, and joint mechanism of
human rights protection within the CIS.  CIS Economic Union Treaty, Sept. 24,
1993, 34 I.L.M. 1298, available at http://www.cis.minsk.by/russian/osn_dokum/
cis_doc1.htm.
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nicely sounding, but ultimately ineffectual, subsidiary agreements on free
trade (April 1994), payments (October 1994), customs (January 1995), le-
gal harmonisation (January 1996), customs classification lists (February
1996), and railway tariffs (October 1996).  In reality, these agreements
incorporated little in the way of effective sanctions and enforcement pow-
ers, but expressed mere intentions.  As a first step towards the Economic
Union, the CIS Member States signed the Agreement to establish the
free trade zone and the 1994 Agreement to establish a payment union.
2. 1994-2000
In the second period from 1994 to 2000, the speed of the CIS integra-
tion lost its initial impetus.  The CIS Member States appeared reluctant to
implement their earlier integration commitments.  To respond to this
challenge, the group of leading CIS Member States embarked upon the
policy of enhanced cooperation by setting up regional integration struc-
tures.  One of the first CIS enhanced regional integration initiatives took
place in Central Asia.  Three Central Asian former USSR republics, Ka-
zakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyz Republic, established the customs
union, Central Asian Economic Area, on April 30, 1994.  Four years later,
Tajikistan joined the Central Asian Economic Area.  The institutional
framework of the Central Asian Economic Area replicates the institu-
tional structure of the CIS and comprises the Interstate Council and the
Interstate Executive Committee, Council of Heads of governments, the
Council of Foreign Ministers, and Council of Defense Ministers.  It also
established the Central Asian cooperation bank.  The Executive Commit-
tee of the Area is situated in Bishkek in the Kyrgyz Republic.
However, in a very short time, it became apparent that the Central
Asian Economic Area could hardly function without Russia.  Thus, most
of the Central Asian Economic Area Member States turned their integra-
tion aspirations toward the new customs union.  On March 26, 1996, five
CIS Member States (Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyz Republic, and
Tajikistan from February 1999) signed the Agreement to enhance the mu-
tual integration in economic and humanitarian areas, which was eventu-
ally aimed at establishing a customs union between the five CIS Member
States, as well as the common policies in areas of economy, science, edu-
cation, culture, and social protection.  Institutions of the Community rep-
licate the CIS institutional structure.  The staff quarter of the Integration
Committee is situated in Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan.14
Almost simultaneously, two CIS Member States, Russia and Belarus,
agreed to go as far as merging into a bilateral political and economic
union.  The first agreement for the establishment of the Russia-Belarus
14. Problems in fair application of VAT and excise duties constituted major impedi-
ments for functioning of the customs union.  In most cases, the non-Russian mem-
bers were raising their tariffs and VAT to match the Russian levels.  The
Kazakhstan’s proposal to pay VAT in the country of selling was refused due to tax
evasion fears.
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Community was signed in April 1996.15  On December 8, 1999 the presi-
dents of both countries signed the Treaty on the Russia – Belarus Union,
which the comprehensive Working Programme supplemented.16  The
Treaty designates to the Union the legal personality in accordance with
international law17 and endorses the respect of the principles of sover-
eignty and equality of the members of the Union.  Thus, apart from vol-
untary transferred competences, the parties to the Union maintain
complete sovereignty and territorial integrity.  The Union pursues objec-
tives aimed at: (1) enhanced cooperation in the political sphere (coordi-
nation of common foreign policy); (2) economic cooperation (customs
union, single currency, national treatment of nationals and companies);
(3) harmonisation of social policies; (4) defense and border protection
cooperation; and (5) cooperation in the legal sphere (unification of legis-
lation, mutual legal assistance).  Citizens of Russia and Belarus enjoy the
Union citizenship on conditions similar to the EU citizenship.  The Union
Treaty envisions the gradual introduction of the common currency be-
tween the parties to the Union Treaty with a subsequent establishment of
a common monetary emission centre.  The Union Treaty does not con-
sider the creation of the Union Armed Forces, but foresees the establish-
ment of regional armed troops.
The Highest State Council is the major decision-making organ of the
Union.  It comprises heads of both states’ governments and parliaments,
and it is chaired by one of the parties on the principle of rotation.  The
Highest State Council adopts decisions on the basis of unanimity and en-
dowed powers to sign international treaties on behalf of the Union.  The
Parliament of the Union was set up as the representative and legislative
institution.  It has two chambers, the Chamber of Union and the Cham-
ber of Representatives.  The former consists of appointed members of
both states.  The latter is formed on the basis of direct election for the
term of four years.  The Parliament of the Union issues Union laws and
ensures the unification of the national legal systems of Russia and Be-
larus, approve the budget of the Union.  The Council of Ministers is the
main executive institution of the Union appointed by the Highest State
Council.  It drafts the Union laws and budget, ensures the enforcement of
the Highest State Council decisions and application of Union laws, and
coordinates common policies of the Union.  The Court of the Union en-
sures the unified interpretation and application of the Treaty of the
Union and legal acts of the Union by issuing binding decisions.18  The
Permanent Committee assists the Union institutions in drafting Union le-
15. The Russia-Belarus Union Charter was signed on May 23, 1997.
16. For comprehensive information about the Russia – Belarus Union, see http://www.
sinfo.ru (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
17. CIS Economic Union Treaty, supra note 13, art. 4, 34 I.L.M. at 1304.
18. The Court is comprised of nine judges appointed by the Parliament of the Union
upon the proposal of the Highest State Council.  Judges occupy their offices for six
year terms that rotate every two years.  The Court decisions are mandatory for the
application.
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gal acts and coordinating political and economic cooperation between the
members of the Union.
The formation of the Union is not finished since the adoption of the
Constitution of the Union, which is going to set up the competence and
legal structure of the Union, is still pending.  The draft of the Union Con-
stitution envisages the creation of the Union State.  The Member States
are expected to transfer part of their competences to the Union State,
while sustaining national sovereignty.  The Union State project is going to
be supplemented by the Russian-Belarus customs union, internal market,
and single currency.  Legal acts of the Union State are going to be consid-
ered as directly applicable within the Member States’ territory.  Thus, the
most advanced regional integration project within the CIS area might
emerge out of the Russia – Belarus Union.  Nevertheless, it is unlikely
that the Union’s supranational nature would attract many CIS Member
States.  Hitherto, despite the possibility for any country to join the Russia
– Belarus Union, none of the CIS Member States have formally ex-
pressed their willingness to participate in this initiative.
In opposition to the Russia – Belarus rapprochement, Pro-Western CIS
Member States have explored variable forms of integration beyond origi-
nal CIS structures.  One of the most widely known projects of this kind is
the GUUAM (the Member States’ acronym).  It was founded on October
10, 1997, in Strasbourg, at the Council of Europe Summit, where the pres-
idents of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova signed the Com-
munique´ on enhanced cooperation19 (Uzbekistan from April 24, 1999).
The GUUAM was created as merely an intergovernmental forum for po-
litical and economic cooperation20 without international legal personality.
There are no executive organs in GUUAM, but all activities within the
GUUAM competence are undertaken mainly by national coordinators.21
As opposed to the CIS agenda, the GUUAM focuses on consolidation
of Euro Atlantic integration efforts of its Member States.  For that pur-
pose, the GUUAM Member States join their efforts to launch common
19. Officially, the GUUAM was launched in Baku on November 25, 1997.
20. The GUUAM Member States pursue their cooperation within the following areas:
(1) joint peace keeping operations; (2) mutual assistance in solving regional con-
flicts; (3) energy supply; (4) establishment of the Euro Asian transport and indus-
trial corridor; (5) common positions at international organisations as for problems
of common interest; and (6) joint rapprochement with the transatlantic and Euro-
pean institutions.
21. The GUUAM institutional structure is comprised of: (1) the Annual Summit of
heads of the GUUAM Member States is the highest institution; (2) the Council of
foreign affairs ministers is the executive institution; (3) the Committee of National
Coordinators implements GUUAM activities; and (4) the GUUAM information
office.  GUUAM Working Groups ensure cooperation within specific fields, such
as energy, telecommunications, culture, science and education, tourism, fighting
terrorism, and organised crime and drugs trade.  The GUUAM Business Council
was created at the GUUAM Yalta Summit in 2002, as a coordination institution for
encouraging cooperation between business circles in the GUUAM Member States.
The first GUUAM Business Forum took place in Baku in 2002.  There are plans to
establish the GUUAM Parliamentary Assembly.  The GUUAM Anti Terror Cen-
tre was set up in 2003 under the U.S. government sponsorship.
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pan Eurasian transport and energy projects (“Europe – Caucasus – Asia”
transport corridor, Eurasian oil corridor).  The GUUAM free trade area
Agreement was signed on November 4-5, 2002, in Kiev, and was ratified
by all GUUAM Member States.  Hitherto, the GUUAM free trade area
arrangements are not completed.22  At the second GUUAM Summit on
July 20, 2002, in Yalta, the President of Ukraine called for the expansion
of the GUUAM cooperation objectives to include new dimensions of re-
gional security, money laundering, and fights with terrorism.  However,
the GUUAM did not prove different and more successful than other CIS
regional integration initiatives.  Uzbekistan formally abandoned this initi-
ative in 2003, being openly dissatisfied with poor effectiveness of the
GUUAM cooperation programme.  Political factors like change of politi-
cal environment in Azerbaijan and Georgia in 2003, and coming presi-
dential elections in Ukraine in 2004, caused the period of uncertainty and
stagnation in realisation of the GUUAM objectives.
Another integration initiative beyond the CIS, known as the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (BSEC), was set up as a regional economic or-
ganisation with legal personality on June 5, 1998, at the BSEC Summit in
Yalta.23  Its major objective is to encourage the regional cooperation of
countries of the Black Sea region.24  The founding Istanbul Declaration
on Black Sea Cooperation was signed on June 25, 1992, by all Black Sea
region countries and beyond, including Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and
Ukraine.  Countries with strategic interests in the Black Sea region (Po-
land, Tunisia, Israel, Egypt, Slovakia, Italy, Austria, France, and Ger-
many) obtained the BSEC observer status.
The BSEC Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs is the highest
decision-making authority with competence to issue binding resolutions,
decisions, and non-binding recommendations.25  The Committee of Se-
nior Officials represents the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.  The
Committee functions as a board where all pertinent BSEC matters are
discussed and submitted thereafter to the approval of the Council Perma-
nent International Secretariat (PERMIS).  The latter performs secretarial
services and acts as the coordinating centre for the whole BSEC process.
The BSEC agenda focuses on the establishment of a Europe-wide eco-
22. Ukraine in cooperation with OBSE is coordinating the BSEC free trade area ne-
gotiation process.
23. The BSEC Charter came into force on May 1, 1999. BSEC CHARTER, available at
http://www.bsec.gov.tr/charter_.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).  The BSEC ob-
tained the observer status in the UN in 1999.  For the BSEC statutory documents
and other related information, see Organization of the Black Sea Economic Coop-
eration, Charter and Statutory Documents, available at http://www.bsec.gov.tr (last
visited Aug. 28, 2004) [hereinafter BSEC Documents].
24. Turkey was the major driving force behind this initiative.
25. In accordance with articles 17-19 of the BSEC Rules of Procedure, the BSEC
Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs Decisions are adopted by qualified
majority and binding as for the Member States that voted for it.  The BSEC Coun-
cil of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs Recommendations have no binding force.
BSEC Documents, supra note 23.
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nomic area, enhancement of mutual economic cooperation,26 and im-
provement of business environment between the BSEC Member States.27
The ultimate objective of the BSEC is the establishment of the BSEC
Free Trade Area to ensure non-discriminatory access of the Member
States goods and services to their markets.  The BSEC Member States
already embarked upon specific projects of common interest: (1) estab-
lishing the Black Sea Transport Circle; (2) setting up the united energy
network; and (3) implementing a common programme on fighting or-
ganised crime.  However, the BSEC Member States face serious
problems in implementing objectives of the organisation.  These
problems relate to shortage of financial resources, lack of coherent defini-
tion of aims and priorities, and poor enforcement of adopted resolutions
and decisions.  Besides, the BSEC Member States belong to different
geopolitical groups.  Some BSEC Member States are the EU Member
States (Greece) or should obtain the EU membership in the definite fu-
ture (Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey), while others emphatically deny any in-
terest in the EU integration (Russia).  Some BSEC Member States
(Ukraine and Moldova) consider using the BSEC structures for their EU
membership aspirations.28
3. 2000-2003
The third period of the CIS integration activities coincided with a
change of political leadership in Russia in 2000, when Vladimir Putin
came into power.  His strong standing on continuing Russian military ac-
tions in Chechnya contributed to the elevation of the anti-terrorism issue
to the height of the CIS agenda.  In 2000, the Council of Heads of State
adopted the programme of the CIS member states on struggle against
international terrorism and other kinds of extremism for the period up to
2003.  At that time, the CIS Anti-terrorism Centre was established.
Further acceleration of the CIS economic integration was associated
with the birth of the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) in Kazakh-
stan, in October 2000.  Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
26. In accordance with articles 3 and 4 of the BSEC Charter, the Parties cooperate
within the specific areas of transport, standardization, energy, tourism, agriculture,
health care, science and technology, banking and finance, exchange of statistical
data, emergencies, combating crime, economic development, and communications.
BSEC CHARTER arts. 3, 4.
27. BSEC Member States have undertaken the following activities to improve mutual
business environment: (1) signing bilateral agreements on free movement of busi-
nessmen; (2) setting up favourable conditions for mutual investments, sustaining
capital flows, and exchanging information; (3) protecting the Black Sea environ-
ment; and (4) establishing the Black Sea Foreign Trade and Investment Bank.  For
instance, the BSEC Member States signed Agreements on the elimination of visa
barriers for business and for lorry drivers, the Agreement on early warning on
nuclear disaster, and the Agreement on civil nuclear energy.
28. The BSEC Economic Agenda for the Future calls to pursue further integration
within the BSEC integration, in accordance with the recent BSEC Member States’
bilateral arrangements with the EU (Europe Agreements and PCAs) and in accor-
dance with the WTO rules.
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and Tajikistan joined the EEC as full members.  Armenia, Ukraine, and
Moldova decided to limit their participation in the EEC by the observer
status.  The EEC Agreement is based upon existing CIS customs union
agreements, though with the explicit intention to push the EEC economic
integration toward ASEAN or NAFTA-style international trade agree-
ments.29  Another rationale behind the EEC is the need to coordinate the
Member States’ efforts to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) and,
subsequently, to increase their negotiation power within the WTO acces-
sion negotiation process.  The EEC promulgates respect to the principle
of sovereignty of its member states, but it is vested with the legal person-
ality and some negotiating powers within international organisations.30
The Inter-State Council, the Integration Committee, the Inter-Parliament
Assembly, and the EEC Court form the institutional skeleton of the
EEC.  The EEC differs from its predecessors in the respect that it has
greater enforcement powers than other CIS customs arrangements.  For
instance, a member state that refuses to abide by the EEC rules can be
excluded from the Community.31  The EEC voting and financing schemes
reflect the weighting powers of its Member States.  Thus, Russia exercises
forty percent of the voting rights and, subsequently, meets forty percent
of the EEC’s budget commitments.  Belarus and Kazakhstan have twenty
percent of the voting shares each.  Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have ten
percent each.  The voting formula implies that, on any given major policy
issue, Russia should have at least two other states supporting it to ensure
a victory on a vote.32  It also implies that Russia exercises a veto power
on major EEC policy decisions.
The EEC laws are not directly applicable within the Member States
legal orders.  None of the EEC’s institutions are authorised to issue laws
binding for the Member States.  Instead, decisions of the EEC institutions
must be enforced only through the national legislation and constitutional
enforcement procedure of the EEC Member States.33  The lack of direct
applicability of EEC laws could be considered as a compromise to attract
more Member States into the EEC.  However, Ukraine and Caucasus
CIS Member States remain distant from the EEC.  Hitherto, the EEC
made quite modest progress in the course of realisation of its initial aims.
Throughout its short history the EEC Member States have not been ea-
ger to accelerate the implementation of key EEC decisions, therefore, the
objective of EEC free trade area leaves much to be desired.
The latest breakthrough on the issue of creating a free trade area
within the CIS took place at the Yalta CIS Summit on September 18-19,
2003.  In the Yalta Declaration, the CIS Heads of State acknowledged
29. For the EEC documents and other related information, see http://www.ipaeurasec.
org/evra/?data=Evra (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
30. EEC CHARTER art. 11.
31. Id. art. 9.
32. The EEC Charter specifies that a vote on major policy issues will require the
agreement of two-thirds of the Member States. Id.
33. Id. art. 14.
2004] POST-USSR AREA 643
that the establishment of a free trade zone with the gradual advancement
towards a single economic space is the absolute priority for the CIS inte-
gration.  In this respect Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine took
an initiative and signed the Agreement on Single Economic Space (SES).
Therein the parties expressed their interest to: (1) set up the SES free
trade area without exceptions; (2) create a common policy of tariff and
non-tariff regulation; (3) start to harmonize competition and state aids
rules, standards, and sanitary norms; (4) ensure free movement of goods,
services, workers, and capital; (5) harmonize national legislations, espe-
cially in area of competition and trade; (6) adopt common principles of
functioning of natural monopolies, especially in rail transport, telecom-
munication, energy, oil, and gas; and finally, (7) dismantle discrimination
in access to mutual markets.  The SES is going to function on principles of
supranational and intergovernmental cooperation, and in accordance
with the WTO trade rules.  The Council of Heads of State coordinates the
SES activities in accordance with the one country – one vote principle.
The SES supranational institution is going to be established with the com-
petence to issue binding decisions.  The voting power within the suprana-
tional institution is going to be shared in accordance with economic
strength of the SES Member States.  The SES cooperation strategy is
based on the principle of multi-level and multi-speed integration.  It
means that the SES Member States enjoy freedom to pick up and choose
specific SES initiatives and projects, which they would like to adhere to.
However, the SES Agreement warns that transition from one level of
integration to a higher level of integration is possible only after comple-
tion of previous levels of integration.
Unfortunately, the SES Agreement failed to ensure the direct applica-
bility of the SES legal acts within the Member States legal systems.  In-
stead, the Member States implement and, subsequently, enforce decisions
of the SES institutions through national constitutional arrangements just
like any other international law obligations.  It appears that the newly
born SES initiative already echoes some significant setbacks.  Ukraine
apparently expresses some reluctance towards its participation in the SES
process due to its growing fears that its participation in the SES would
contradict EU aspirations, inter alia setting up the free trade area with the
EC.  In the latest resolution, the EP has explicitly noted that the
Ukraine’s participation in the SES would impede its European integra-
tion perspectives.34  Furthermore, the continuing Russian tough stance on
liberalization of its energy sector undermines the original idea of the SES
serving as a common forum in the course of the WTO accession negotia-
34. Resolution on ‘Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations
with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 104), para.
18 (2003), available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/delegations/esto/
20031208/07.docen.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).  This European Parliament res-
olution explicitly states, “[T]he projected establishment of a Common Economic
Space together with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan could hamper further cooper-
ation between Ukraine and the EU.” Id.
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tions.  Therefore, the SES founding Member States (Ukraine) steadily
pursue unilateral WTO accession negotiations.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The intergovernmental CIS serves as an attractive platform for mutual
cooperation of the sovereignty concerned CIS Member States.  Neverthe-
less, the full CIS potential is hardly explored yet.  Indeed, the fulfilment
of CIS’s original objectives of a political, defensive, and peacekeeping
partnership is pending.  The CIS substantive economic agenda is yet to be
properly considered.  On one side, the history of the CIS already offers us
a valuable experience that ought to be taken into account in the course of
further integration initiatives.  On other side, one has to acknowledge
that the CIS future is doomed.  The depth of the CIS integration seems
irrevocably scooped.  Several points are relevant here to prove such a
bitter statement.
First, there is no steadfast regional leader within the CIS that could
take up all responsibilities for leading, and subsequently, financially con-
tributing to further intergovernmental CIS programmes.  Russia is not
ready for the ambitious role to respond to national interests of ever-di-
verging CIS Member States.  Furthermore, Russia could already be tired
of its repeatedly failing efforts to start up the CIS integration engine.  For
more than a decade, none of the CIS dazzling initiatives have been
crowned with acknowledged success, but remain in the cradle.
Second, the CIS objectives focus mainly on regional integration, but do
not offer substantive responses to the international globalisation
processes, inter alia the accession of the CIS Member States into the
WTO.  As a result, most of the CIS Member States still remain distant
from the international economic environment.  Meanwhile, only three
out of twelve CIS Member States have joined the WTO.35
Third, the gap in economic development and political priorities of the
CIS Member States is constantly yawning.  On the background of the
tightening Russia-Belarus Union, Moldova and Ukraine openly promul-
gated their European aspirations.  Therefore, the CIS Member States
maintain a strong preference to the bilateral relations over multilateral
agreements in pursuing the CIS initiatives.  Further contradictions might
arise when the enlarged EU advances to the western CIS borders and
launches its neighbourhood policy, thereby encouraging neighbour CIS
Member States to integrate into the EC internal market.
However, the need for closer integration in the post-USSR area could
hardly fade away in the near future.  The CIS Member States steadily
approach an economic recovery.  The CIS area comprises a vast and ex-
tremely attractive market of twelve countries with 221,146 square km of
35. Kyrgyz Republic acquired WTO membership on December 20, 1998; Georgia on
June 14, 2000; Moldova on July 26, 2001.  Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
Russia, and Uzbekistan have an observer status.
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territory36 and total population of about 277.4 million,37 with annually
increasing industrial output and GDP.38  The CIS mutual trade is con-
stantly growing.39  Relative stability of national currencies exchange rates
was retained at the currency market of the majority of the CIS countries.
However, overly competitive foreign markets remain hardly accessible
for cheap goods and services from the CIS Member States.  With exemp-
tion to Russia, all CIS Member States are labelled as non-market econ-
omy countries that significantly aggravate their chances to escape
discriminative anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures.40  Furthermore,
developed western countries appear reluctant to be engaged in long-term
economic projects with the CIS Member States in areas of energy, trans-
port, armament, and space.  Yet none of the CIS Member States entered
into free trade area arrangements with global trade powers.41  The EU-
Russia Single Economic Area project is still undergoing long delibera-
tions and is unlikely to move further before completion of the EU en-
largement saga.
Therefore, there are few alternatives to further regional economic inte-
gration within the CIS area.  The core group of the CIS Member States is
pushing forward the enhanced economic agenda.  It is argued that the
eventual establishment of the CIS free trade area/customs union would
contribute to dismantling discriminatory obstacles of mutual access to the
CIS markets.  In short-term dimension, further CIS economic integration
would protect fragile CIS industries and businesses from highly competi-
tive international goods and services after joining the WTO.  However,
one has to consider if these short-term recipes suit long-term appetites of
all CIS Member States that seriously consider themselves as part of the
36. Versus 31,911 sq. km-in the EU of fifteen Member States.
37. Versus 370 million in the EU of fifteen Member States.
38. Recent growth of the CIS Member States GDP constitutes 7-12% annually.  How-
ever, this progress is not so impressive since it is only 40-50% percent of what
existed in early nineties.
39. The biggest CIS exporters are Russia (53.5%), Belarus (13.8%), Ukraine (13.3%),
and Kazakhstan (7.4%).  Biggest importers are Russia (29.2%), Ukraine (28.8%),
Belarus (20.6%), and Kazakhstan (8.3%).  However few CIS Member States main-
tain active trade with third countries, such as Russia (62.7%), Ukraine (14.2%),
and Kazakhstan (6.7%). See CIS Interstate Statistical Committee database, at
http://www.cisstat.com (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
40. According to the European Commission, there are about sixty anti-dumping inves-
tigations and measures considered by the EU against goods from the CIS Member
States by the end of 2003.
41. All CIS countries, apart from Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Belarus (two latter did
not come into force), have signed almost identical bilateral Cooperation and Part-
nership Agreements (PCAs) with the EC and the Member States.  These agree-
ments pursue objectives of closer political dialogue and economic cooperation, but
do not offer any perspective of the EU membership.  The evolutionary clause for
the European PCAs (Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova) envisions the possibility of
setting up a free trade area with the EU upon successful completion of market
reforms. See R. Petrov, The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the
Newly Independent States, in HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT – A COM-
MENTARY ON THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS 175-194 (Andrea Ott & Kirstyn Inglis
eds., 2002) (detailing comparative overview and scrutiny of the PCAs).  The USA
entered into bilateral trade agreements with all the CIS countries.
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European space.  In the meantime, these countries face a puzzling di-
lemma.  On one hand, Pro-Western CIS Member States (Ukraine and
Moldova) continue to be cautious about sacrificing their European aspi-
rations to unpredictable trade arrangements within the CIS.  On the
other hand, these countries meet a lukewarm response from the EU to
their insisting free trade area proposals.  Thus, a key for the next CIS
integration programme could be hidden in Europe, or in other words, in
the European attitude towards further eastward enlargement.
